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Abstract 
 
This paper presents the results from a questionnaire among Dutch car owners. We have analysed the 
behavioural responses to three different, policy relevant, road pricing measures. Depending on the type of 
measure and type of trip affected, we find reductions in the number of car trips of, on average, 11%. A flat 
kilometre charge affects social trips considerably more than commuting trips. However, when policy 
makers want to affect peak time (commuting) traffic, a time differentiated measure is more appropriate. 
Slow traffic and trip suppression are most popular alternatives for non-commuting trips. Departure time 
changes become very attractive for all purposes when the proposed measure varies over time. 
 
Keywords: Road pricing; Behavioural response; Traffic reduction. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
People’s responses to transport pricing are not straightforward. Price increases may not 
necessarily lead to trip suppression, it may also induce travellers to change their modal 
use or change their departure time, depending on the type of measure. A wide variety of 
transport pricing measures exists, having different consequences for travel behaviour. 
Price measures are considered as one of the major tools for policy-makers to influence 
transport development. The design of measures will generally depend on the objectives 
set by the government. It is therefore important for authorities to have clear insight into 
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the responses induced by transport pricing. This response will to a considerable extent 
depend on the exact design of the pricing scheme (e.g. a yearly tax on car ownership can 
be expected to affect kilometrage of a given vehicle relatively weakly, compared to a 
kilometre charge). Equally important, however, is the price sensitivity (often expressed as 
elasticities by economists) of transport users for the various relevant types of behaviour 
that together define transport behaviour. People have various possibilities to change 
transport behaviour, and can be expected to react differently to different pricing schemes.  
This paper presents the empirical results from a survey among Dutch car owners towards 
the behavioural effects of various, policy relevant (at least for the Dutch situation), road 
pricing measures. Three different type of measures have been evaluated by the 
respondents. We will analyse the short term behavioural responses in terms of sensitivity 
and type of change for three different trip purposes.  
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses possible behavioural responses 
to transport pricing and it gives a brief overview of previous literature results. Section 3 
explains the structure of the questionnaire and the type of price measures that have been 
evaluated by the respondents. Section 4 presents the effectiveness outcomes in terms of 
car trips that will be replaced by the respondents (including how these trips will be 
changed). Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Road transport pricing and behavioural responses 
 
Governments have many different options to intervene in the transport market. Road 
pricing is one of the possibilities. Current widely implemented price measures in road 
transport include a tax on vehicle ownership (either at purchase or on an annual basis), 
parking fees and fuel taxes. Alternative pricing measures include distance related taxes 
(e.g. a kilometre charge) or particular emission based charges. Also the opposite of 
charging, viz. subsidising, is a price instrument. Public transport subsidies are for 
instance often seen as a useful second-best policy in cases where private road transport 
for some reason cannot be, or is not priced.  
Transport users will respond differently to various pricing policies. The possible 
outcomes (in terms of behavioural responses) of pricing can be the following: 
 
• trip suppression (travel frequency choice); 
• departure time choice (and scheduling of daily activities); 
• different route choice; 
• changes in modal split; 
• changes in vehicle occupancy; 
• spatial choices related to re-location; 
• change in driving style (e.g. speed choice); 
• vehicle ownership;  
• technology choice; 
• changes in destination choice; 
• class choice (for public transport). 
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Depending on the desired aim, policy makers may now decide to make use of a 
particular price instrument that is likely to steer travel behaviour in a more desired 
direction. However, it should not be forgotten that the real effect of a price change 
depends on various factors which makes the effect predictability of a certain measure 
rather difficult. Factors affecting price sensitivity include among others (VTPI, 2002): 
 
• Type of price change: the different types of pricing measures can have different 
impacts on travel behaviour.  
• Type of trip and traveller: commute trips tend to be less elastic than shopping or 
recreational trips.  
• Quality and price of alternative routes, modes and destinations: price sensitivity tends 
to increase if alternative routes, modes and destinations are of good quality and 
affordable. For example, road users tend to be more price sensitive if there is a 
parallel untolled roadway.  
• Time period: transportation elasticities tend to increase over time as consumers have 
more opportunities to take prices into effect when making long-term decisions (Oum 
et al., 1997). Dargay and Gately (1997) conclude that about 30% of the response to a 
price change takes place within 1 year, and that virtually all takes place within 13 
years.  
• Large and cumulative price changes: extra care should be used when calculating the 
impacts of large price changes, or when summing the effects of multiple changes, 
because each subsequent change impacts a different base.  
 
In the next subsection we will briefly discuss some results from the transport economic 
literature on the behavioural responses to transport pricing (this draws on previous work 
carried out within the MD-PIT project, see Ubbels and Verhoef, 2003). We pay specific 
attention to work that analysed the effects of variabilisation in the Netherlands, because 
we will evaluate similar types of measures for the same country. Variabilisation refers to 
the situation where present car taxation(independent of car use) is replaced by a kilometre 
charge. 
 
 
2.1 Previous literature 
 
A substantial body of empirical economic literature analyses the effects of pricing 
measures on particular types of behaviour and reports elasticities (a measure of 
responsiveness of demand to a change in price)1. But not only own demand 
responsiveness can be captured by elasticities, also the use of other modes by changing a 
particular price can be measured (i.e. cross-price elasticities). Although it is possible to 
derive elasticities from empirical data (e.g., a before-and-after study of an infrastructure 
project), normally models are used to derive elasticities. Different types of empirical data 
are used to derive elasticities. Stated preference data give the reactions as stated by the 
respondents (e.g. travellers), when confronted with hypothetical alternatives. Revealed 
preference is based on choices actually made appearing from observed behaviour.  
                                                 
1 The price elasticity of demand is defined as the percentage change in the quantity demanded divided by 
the percentage change in price (Stiglitz and Driffill, 2000). 
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A wide variety of estimates of price elasticities have appeared in economic literature. 
Among the most widely studied elasticies in transport is the fuel price elasticity. Most 
estimates of the price elasticity of gasoline consumption are in the range between -0.27 
(short run) and -0.71 (long run) (see for an overview Oum and others, 1997 and 
Goodwin, 1992). Elasticities with respect to vehicle kilometre charges, interesting in the 
context of this study, are less often reported. There are only a few recent studies which 
consider the impact of kilometre charges on car use. The European Commission has 
carried out a major survey on road pricing elasticities (European Commission, 1996). The 
estimated elasticities consider the effect of road pricing on car use, modal split and route 
choice. The effects on car use depend on the purpose of the trip: shopping and social trips 
have the highest, commuter trips the lowest elasticities. The cross-price elasticities range 
from 0.05 to 0.4 and depend on the transport mode considered (rail or metro) and on the 
level of charge applied. Geurs and Van Wee (1997) report the results of a variable costs 
elasticity by using the FACTS model. The effects on car use of a kilometre charge have 
been simulated by increasing the variable maintenance costs with €cent 5 per kilometre 
(on a default of €cent 0.5 to 1.5). This results in an elasticity of around –0.20.  
Empirical results have been analysed to derive revealed effects and behavioural 
responses to road pricing in practice (of which effects can also be expressed in 
elasticities). Despite the fact that road pricing is only rarely implemented, the experiences 
so far show interesting results. Singapore and Orange County, for instance, are interesting 
and valuable examples of situations where road pricing is actually implemented. It 
appears that the effects depend very much on local situations (e.g. public transport 
availability) and the charging scheme at hand. Road pricing in Singapore, aimed at 
reducing peak period congestion, was first implemented in 1975 in the form of the Area 
Licensing Scheme (ALS) and upgraded in 1998 to Electronic Road Pricing (ERP). A 
method of shoulder pricing is used, which involves increasing the rate in steps every half 
an hour before the peak and decreasing it after the peak (with charges depending on 
vehicle type). It appears that traffic is quite sensitive to the road pricing system even 
though the charges are relatively low, the maximum rate for cars on expressways and to 
enter the restricted zone is comparable to a 1-hour parking fee in the city (about €1.50) 
(Olszewiski and Xie, 2005). The elasticity values shown in Table 1 indicate that time of 
driving will change with time dependent charges. Evening peak traffic flows show the 
highest demand sensitivity, with an elasticity of -0.32 for cars. The low figures for the 
morning peak can be explained by arrival time restrictions for commuters, whereas trips 
to home in the evening can be postponed to avoid the high peak charge.  
 
Table 1: Elasticity of traffic entering the restricted zone by time interval. 
Time period Cars Other vehicles (motorcycles, 
taxis, LGV’s, HGV’s, buses) 
All vehicles 
7:30-9:30 
9:30-15:00 
15:30-17:30 
17:30-19:00 
7:30-19:00 
-0.106 
-0.082 
-0.123 
-0.324 
-0.123 
-0.019 
-0.080 
-0.151 
-0.189 
-0.106 
-0.069 
-0.083 
-0.143 
-0.265 
-0.118 
Source: Olszewski and Xie (2005). 
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The toll charge levied by Orange County depends on the vehicle occupancy and on the 
level of congestion on the free lanes next to the toll lane. It appeared that the traveller’s 
decision to use the toll lanes is very closely related to hour-by-hour variations in traffic 
conditions. Results show that a marginal increase in the peak period tariff on the toll 
facility has only little effect on (increased) travel demand in shoulder peak periods, only 
very large price changes would induce considerable effects. Moreover, only a few drivers 
decide to car-pool. 
 
 
2.1.1 Variabilisation studies in the Netherlands 
 
Since we study the effects of different types of kilometre charges (including measures 
where revenues are used to compensate for abolition of fixed car taxes), it is interesting to 
discuss results from so-called variabilisation studies. A few studies have been completed 
on this issue in the Netherlands, initiated by the increasing policy interest for a kilometre 
charge.  
One of the first studies towards the mobility effects of variabilisation was conducted by 
MuConsult in 1998 (MuConsult, 1998). A model was used to study the effects of 
different kilometre charges with the restriction that the revenues for the government 
remain constant (fixed car taxation was lowered accordingly or abolished). They show 
that, depending on the level of the charge, implementation may lead to a considerable 
reduction in total kilometres driven. A kilometre charge of 7 €ct, for instance, leads to a 
total reduction of 19%. Business traffic is least affected in this scenario (7%), whereas 
social traffic (23%) and commuting traffic (19%) are most sensitive. Most of these car 
kilometres is replaced by bicycle use and car-pooling. Effects are less strong when the 
charge is lower. A charge of 3 €ct is estimated to decrease commuting traffic with 5% 
and social traffic with 8%. A remarkable prediction of this study is the decrease in car 
ownership for all scenarios considered; apparently the effect of the increase in the 
variable charge dominates the effect of lower ownership costs.  
A stated preference survey among car owners as well as non-car owners reported in 
MuConsult (2002) has also analysed the behavioral responses to different types of a 
kilometre charge with abolition of fixed taxes. We will here discuss their predicted 
effects of the replacement of the Dutch car ownership tax (the so-called MRB) only, and 
both the MRB and the tax on car purchase (the so-called BPM). The charges were 
differentiated according to fuel type, the MRB-only scenario included a charge of 2.4 €ct 
per kilometre for petrol using cars (with slightly higher charges for cars running on diesel 
and gas), whereas the MRB+BPM scenario contained a charge of 4.9 €ct (equal levels for 
other fuel types). In contrast to the earlier MuConsult study, this study predicts an 
increase in car ownership levels for all alternatives considered. The car stock is assumed 
to show a stronger growth under the MRB-only scenario compared to the MRB+BPM 
scenario (2.8% vs. 1.2%). The higher charges in this latter scenario induce relatively 
more car owners (4.6% vs. 1.3%) to sell their car. The effect on the second-hand market 
where prices may go down on the car stock has not been included. The results in terms of 
kilometres indicate a small reduction for the MRB-only scenario of about 0.9% and a 
somewhat larger effect of 3.4% for the other scenario. These effects include a decrease in 
kilometres by car owners and an increase of kilometres driven by respondents that 
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indicate to purchase a new car (estimated around 2% for both scenarios). Especially 
social, shopping and recreational trips will be adjusted, whereas business traffic and 
kilometres driven for school or educational purposes remain almost unchanged. 
Commuting trips will be adjusted (about 30%), but less often than the social and 
shopping trips. 
Recently (initiated by a request from the Dutch Minister to search for a new, widely 
approved, pricing regime), the traffic effects of various road pricing alternatives have 
once more been investigated using the LMS (Landelijk Model Systeem, a network model 
developed to forecast traffic flows for the Netherlands) model (Adviesdienst Verkeer en 
Vervoer, 2005). Among the ten different alternatives that have been evaluated, there were 
four variabilisation measures. When all fixed taxes (MRB and BPM) are replaced by a 
kilometre charge (with budget neutrality for the government), the model predicts a 
decrease in car use (in terms of kilometres) of 11% (compared with the reference 
situation in 2020). The average charge per kilometre causing these effects was about 5.7 
€ct, and depended on fuel type and weight of the car. The level of congestion in 2020 is 
assumed to be reduced with 40% (in terms of vehicle hours lost). People will change 
mode (use of train, bus/metro and slow transport increases in terms of kilometres with 
about 6%) and especially social traffic (29%, in terms of car driven kilometres) and, to a 
lesser extent, commuting (9%) will be reduced. 
Another considered alternative included variabilisation of all car ownership taxes and 
one quarter of the car purchase taxes. The average kilometre charge is consequently 
lower (3.4 €ct) than the previous measure, but an additional charge of 0.11 €ct was levied 
on locations and times with severe congestion. The LMS model outcomes suggest that 
growth of congestion will be reduced with about 45%. Trip distances will decrease. This 
effect is limited for commuting trips but larger for social trips. Business traffic (6%) and 
freight traffic (1%) is predicted to increase, but total traffic demand will decrease (with 
10%) due to considerably less commuting (16%) and social kilometres (25%).  
The modelling studies predict larger effects on car use than the stated preference study 
of MuConsult (2002). However, comparing these studies is not straightforward due to 
differences in the types of measures (e.g. differentiation according to weight versus fuel 
type) that have been evaluated and underlying assumptions (e.g. the LMS model does not 
include car ownership effects). Charge levels in the modelling studies have been on 
average somewhat higher than in the MuConsult 2002 stated preference study, which 
may be one explanation for the larger effects.    
 
 
3. Data collection and survey description 
 
3.1 Data collection 
 
The data have been obtained through an (interactive) internet survey among Dutch car 
owners. The total sample consists of 562 respondents, half of which are car commuters 
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facing congestion on a regular basis, investigated in an earlier questionnaire.2 These 
respondents were confronted with three different road pricing measures, and we asked 
them if and how they expect to change their behaviour when facing these measures. The 
focus is on the short term responses: the more long term decision of car ownership and 
car change have been included in the survey, but these will not be discussed in this 
contribution. The actual data collection was carried out by a specialised firm (NIPO), 
which has a panel of over 50.000 respondents. The data were collected during three 
weeks in February 2005.  
 
 
3.2 Survey 
 
Three different pricing measures will be considered, each in multiple variants. Table 2 
shows the various measures that have been developed: 6 different alternatives for 
measure 1, 2 alternatives for measure 2, and again 6 alternatives of the third measure (a 
more detailed description of these measures can be found in Appendix 2). The 
alternatives were divided randomly over the respondents, and each respondent evaluated 
one alternative of each measure (so three in total). As a result, we obtained at least 88 
observations for each alternative of measure 1 (see also Table 4), 282 for measure 2A and 
280 for measure 2B, and again about 95 for each alternative of measure 3 (see also Table 
8 in Section 4.3).  
 
Table 2: Short description of the road pricing measures presented to the respondents. 
Measure Variant 
1: Flat kilometre charge 
with different charge 
levels and different 
revenue use 
A: 3 €cent, abolition of car ownership taxes 
B: 6 €cent, abolition of existing car taxation (purchase and ownership) 
C: 12 €cent, abolition of existing car taxation and investment in new roads 
D: 3 €cent, revenues used to lower income taxes 
E: 6 €cent, revenues used to lower income taxes 
F: 12 €cent, revenues used to lower income taxes 
2: Differentiated 
kilometre charge with 
different charge levels 
and different revenue 
use 
A: 2 €cent with multistep (morning and evening) peak time toll on bottlenecks, revenues 
   used to abolish car ownership taxes 
B: differentiated according to weight of the car, revenues used to abolish existing car 
     taxation 
3: Crude peak/off-peak 
kilometre charge with 
different charge levels 
and different revenue 
use 
A: 2 €cent outside peak times and 6 €cent in peak, abolition of car ownership taxes 
B: 4 €cent outside peak times and 12 €cent in peak, abolition of existing car taxation 
C: 8 €cent outside peak times and 24 €cent in peak, abolition of existing car taxation and 
          new roads 
D: 2 €cent outside peak times and 6 €cent in peak, revenues used to lower income taxes 
E: 4 €cent outside peak times and 12 €cent in peak, revenues used to lower income taxes 
F: 8 €cent outside peak times and 24 €cent in peak, revenues used to lower income taxes 
 
All descriptions of the measures, as shown to respondents, consisted of two major 
components: we explain both the structure and level of the charge, and the allocation of 
the revenues. Furthermore, we provided each respondent individually with an estimation 
                                                 
2 These respondents have been selected from the first MD-PIT questionnaire of which the results are 
presented in earlier work (Ubbels and Verhoef, 2005). Note that this first survey was ‘over sampled’ in the 
lower income groups so as to obtain a sufficient number of observations. 
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of the financial consequences of the implementation of the proposed measure (on the 
basis of self-reported current travel behaviour and car ownership for unchanged 
behaviour). This estimation depends on the charge level (costs) and on the type of 
revenue use (benefits). Information on the annual number of kilometres driven, and for 
some measures also on the type of vehicle (measure 2B) and time of driving (measures 
2A and 3) is the input for the cost estimation based on present behaviour. The financial 
benefits shown to the respondent depend on the type of revenue use. Because it was 
impossible to give respondents a personal estimation of the financial benefits involved 
with a recycling via lower income taxation, we only presented the savings for those 
measures where existing car taxes are abolished3. We explained also some practical 
issues that were meant to prevent various practical considerations from affecting the 
response: the privacy of car users is guaranteed, electronic equipment registers the toll 
and the driver can choose freely the payment method (e.g. credit card, bank transfer etc.). 
Concerning the representativeness of our sample, we make the following remarks. All 
respondents own a car, which is used for different trip purposes. This is not necessarily 
commuting because not all respondents have a job (17.6% is not employed). The 
educational level of our sample seems relatively high. About 29% of the Dutch car 
owners has a bachelor or masters degree (based on own calculations of CBS data for 
2003), this share is considerably higher in our survey (40%). CBS statistical data also 
suggests that car ownership increases with income. About 20% of the car owners in this 
sample has an income below €28,500 (with 9% having no income). Younger people seem 
to be overrepresented in our survey. About 30% of the car owners in the Netherlands is 
older than 55, while this share is only 16% in this survey. Most of the respondents are 
located in the Randstad area (rest west and large cities), the northern part of the 
Netherlands is only modest represented with 6.4%.  
After a concise description of each measure, the respondents were asked whether they 
would change the number of car trips for three different trip purposes (only in those cases 
that the respondent indicates that he/she actually makes this type of trip):  
 
− commuting trips (made at least sometimes by 70.7% of the respondents); 
− trips to visit people (made at least sometimes by 80.8% of the respondents); 
− other type of trips (e.g. shopping, sports activities etc., made at least sometimes by 
92.7% of the respondents). 
 
Commuting trips are only made by 70% of the respondents, but the intensity of these 
trips during a week is relatively higher. 
If respondents indicate that they indeed expect to adjust their travel behaviour4, they 
were next asked to indicate the share of trips that will be changed, and also how these 
will be changed. Depending on the type of measure (it makes little sense to ask whether 
                                                 
3 The benefits from paying less car taxation depend on the type of car the respondents own (i.e., on fuel 
type and weight). We have estimated averages for nine categories (a combination of three fuel types and 
three weight categories), for an abolition of annual car ownership taxes (MRB) only and an abolition of all 
existing car taxation, namely MRB and the fixed purchase tax (BPM). 
4 It is possible that people indicate to make more car trips, in that case we only asked how many extra trips 
this person would make. 
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respondents will change departure time when a flat kilometre charge is presented), 
various possibilities were presented: 
 
− public transport; 
− slow transport (walking, bicycle); 
− motorised private transport (motorbike, motor); 
− carpool (only asked for commuting trips); 
− work at home (only asked for commuting trips);  
− travel at other times (only when measure is time dependent)5;  
− give up the trip. 
 
In order to analyse the behavioural responses to the proposed pricing measure in a 
quantitative way, we asked the respondents to indicate for each purpose how many trips 
they make in a normal week. Because some type of trips are only made once a week, we 
have asked the respondents to indicate how many trips they will change in a period of 4 
weeks (with presenting their total number of trips made for each purpose (4 times the 
number of trips in a week)). Hence, a respondent indicating that he/she makes 5 
commuting trips a week can change 20 trips at most. Next it was asked how these trips 
will be changed. Respondents could not continue with the survey when the total number 
of trips to be changed was unequal to the sum of numbers allocated to different 
alternatives.  
Stated preference studies like this one may suffer from various biases, e.g. due to the 
hypothetical nature of the questions or due to strategic answering. By asking people to 
indicate very precisely how a certain expected change in total trips was to be 
accomplished, we hope to have minimised the hypothetical bias as much as reasonable 
possible. The strategic bias may result in people understating their willingness to change 
trips, when hoping that ineffectiveness may reduce the chance of the policy to be 
implemented. Because road pricing was not under public debate at the moment the 
questionnaire was held, we have good hopes that the strategic bias is not too large.  
 
 
4. Effectiveness of different pricing regimes 
 
The aim of this survey is to analyse the behavioural responses to realistic and policy 
relevant road pricing measures6. This section focuses on the sensitivity and type of effect 
of the short term responses to three different road pricing measures presented to the 
respondents for three different trip purposes (i.e. commuting, social traffic (visits) and 
other (e.g. shopping)). We have information on the behavioural responses in terms of 
number of trips that an individual will adjust, and how these will be adjusted. Since we 
also have an individual estimation of the yearly number of kilometres driven for each trip 
                                                 
5 Departure time changes have been extensively analysed in an earlier phase of MD-PIT (results obtained 
from a stated choice experiment). 
6 At this moment policy makers in the Netherlands are seriously considering the implementation of a 
kilometre charge that replaces current car taxation.  
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purpose, it is also possible to express changes in terms of kilometres. Information on both 
outcomes will be presented below.  
 
 
4.1 Measure 1: kilometre charge (3, 6 and 12 €ct) and different revenue use 
 
The numbers of respondents that indicated they would adjust their car trips when 
measure 1 becomes reality were 42 (11% of the total number of respondents that makes 
commuting trips) for commuting, 111 (27%) for visits and 111 (23%) for other trip 
purposes. After weighting these adjustments by numbers of trips made and by the length 
of these trips, we can transform these figures into changes in numbers of trips and 
kilometres. Table 3 shows the aggregated outcomes for all alternatives together; 
Appendix 2 gives the detailed results for each measure separately.  
The numbers vary considerably over the various trip purposes. The proposed kilometre 
charge is relatively most effective for trips made to visit people, and least effective for 
commuting trips. This may be explained by the fact that a trip suppression is no serious 
alternative for commuting trips (only 0.5% of trips to be adjusted will not be made 
anymore), whereas for other reasons people seriously consider the alternative of not 
making the trip. Popular alternatives (for all purposes) for car trips include slow transport 
and public transport. Cycling and walking are in particular an alternative for visits and 
other trips, apparently these trips are often of short distance. The effectiveness in terms of 
adjusted number of kilometres is smaller than for numbers of trips, probably people 
driving relatively less adjust their behaviour.  
 
Table 3: Aggregated outcomes of behavioural responses to measure 1: flat kilometre charge. 
 Commuting Visits Other 
Total number of trips (driven in 4 weeks) 6800 3620 7780 
Number of trips adjusted 
Of which: 
Public transport 
Slow traffic 
Motorised 
Carpool 
Working at home 
Not making trip 
400 (5.9%) 
 
31.8% 
32.2% 
9.5% 
19.5% 
6.5% 
0.5% 
513 (14.2%) 
 
17.8% 
44.6% 
8.9% 
not relevant 
not relevant 
28.6% 
846 (10.9%) 
 
13.3% 
64.9% 
1.8% 
not relevant 
not relevant 
19.9% 
Number of kilometres adjusted 3.9% 11.6% 9.2% 
 
It is also interesting to consider the relative effectiveness of the various alternatives of 
measure 1. As expected, a kilometre charge of 12 €ct tends to have more effect than a 
similar measure with lower charges. Table 4 shows the impact of each alternative for the 
various purposes. Some results are different than expected: a measure with a higher 
charge is not always more effective. For instance, measure 1D (with a charge of 3 €ct) 
seems slightly more effective than measure 1E (6 €ct) for particular trip purposes. 
Measure 1F induces the strongest trip changes. Alternatives A, B, and C are 
variabilisation measures, these seem to be less effective than the measures where 
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revenues are used to lower income taxes. The data do not allow us to identify the reason 
for this difference, but we can speculate. One possible explanation is that we could not 
inform the respondents on how much they would receive due to the lowered labour tax, 
while we could make an estimate for the vehicle taxes. If respondents were pessimistic on 
the net benefit from reduced labour taxes, a perceived stronger income effect might 
explain the stronger effectiveness. But respondents might also have been less rational. 
Perhaps they work, implicitly, with predetermined budget allocations over broader groups 
of consumer products. If so, they may not have realised that they could allocate all 
benefits from reduced labour taxes to the mobility budget. This is not a very satisfactory 
explanation, but we can simply not exclude the possibility of irrational responses from at 
least some of our respondents. As stated, we can only hypothesise about the true reason 
for this surprising result. 
 
 
Table 4: Effectiveness related to the alternatives of measure 1. 
% of total trips adjusted  
Measure Number of 
respondents 
Commuting Visits Other 
1A (3 €ct/MRB) 
1B (6 €ct/MRB+BPM) 
1C (12 €ct/MRB+BPM+new roads) 
1D (3 €ct/income taxes) 
1E (6 €ct/income taxes) 
1F (12 €ct/income taxes) 
96 
94 
88 
101 
91 
92 
0 
5.0 
11.3 
25.0 
19.7 
39.0 
9.5 
9.4 
20.3 
15.0 
20.5 
25.3 
13.6 
9.5 
17.6 
21.2 
16.7 
21.5 
 
 
4.2 Measure 2: kilometre charge with multistep bottleneck toll (2A) and kilometre charge 
differentiated according to weight of the vehicle (2B) 
 
The second measure consists of two (very) different alternatives that have in common 
that the charge is strongly differentiated. The first alternative is a peak period charge 
combined with a flat kilometre fee, while the measure 2B is differentiated according to 
weight of the vehicle.  
Table 5 shows the behavioural responses for both alternatives separately. Compared to 
measure 1, we see that one type of response has been added: travel at other times. 
Because only measure 2A is differentiated according to time, this type of behavioural 
response is only relevant for that alternative. Changing travel time is very attractive for 
all trip purposes; people prefer car use at other times over public transport and slow 
traffic, especially for commuting trips. The respondents will try to avoid the bottlenecks 
at certain times and are less inclined to give up trips for social or other purposes 
(relatively to alternative 2B). Note that this alternative has a fine differentiation compared 
with measure 3, and only applies to certain (bottleneck) locations. Measure 2B seems 
relatively less effective for commuting trips, only 4% of the total number of commuting 
trips will be changed. Table 6 confirms this. It shows that measure 2A is responsible for 
almost three quarter of the adjusted commuting trips. Finally, it appears that slow traffic 
is an attractive alternative especially for social purposes. These trips probably often have 
nearby destinations.   
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Table 5: Behavioural responses to measure 2. 
Measure Measure 2A Measure 2B 
Trip purpose Commuting Visits Other Commuting Visits Other 
Total number of trips 
(driven in 4 weeks) 3188 1824 3892 3612 1796 3888 
Trips adjusted (% total) 
Of which: 
Public transport 
Slow traffic 
Motorised 
Car pooling 
Travel at other times 
Working at home 
Not making the trip 
358 (11.2%) 
 
22.3% 
8.9% 
2.5% 
10.6% 
51.1% 
4.2% 
0.3% 
166 (9.1%) 
 
16.9% 
29.5% 
1.4% 
NR 
42.2% 
NR 
10.2% 
359 (9.2%) 
 
13.1% 
38.7% 
1.7% 
NR 
38.2% 
NR 
8.3% 
145 (4.0%) 
 
13.8% 
26.2% 
38.6% 
12.4% 
NR 
6.9% 
2.1% 
150 (8.4%) 
 
14.0% 
46.7% 
8.7% 
NR 
NR 
NR 
30.7% 
308 (7.9%) 
 
9.7% 
66.6% 
1.0% 
NR 
NR 
NR 
22.7% 
Number of kilometres 
adjusted 11.3% 10.3% 8.2% 2.5% 6.7% 7.4% 
NR = not relevant, measure may not be differentiated according to time (2B) or alternative is not relevant 
for trip purpose. 
 
Table 6: Effectiveness related to the alternatives of measure 2. 
% of total trips adjusted   
Number of 
respondents Commuting Visits Other 
2A: multistep bottleneck toll 
2B: km charge weight vehicle 
282  
280 
71.2 
28.8 
52.5 
47.5 
53.8 
46.2 
 
 
4.3 Measure 3: peak and off peak kilometre charge with different revenue use 
 
The third measure is a kilometre charge differentiated crudely according to time (peak 
and off peak only) with different revenue use allocations. Compared to the previous 
measures, this measure is, in terms of total number adjusted trips (for all purposes), most 
effective (14,1% versus 9,7% (measure 1) and 7,6% (measure 2). This measure has 
relatively more impact on commuting trips. The number of trips commuting changed is 
1004 (about 15% of the total trips made for commuting reasons), considerably more than 
400 (measure 1) and 503 (measure 2). Almost half of the trips that will be adjusted, will 
be replaced by trips made off-peak (see Table 7, and Appendix 2 for the disaggregated 
results). Slow traffic is also an attractive alternative, but again only for the non-
commuting purposes. The motor or motorbike is not a serious alternative for the 
respondents, the same holds for carpooling.   
The pattern shown in Table 8 is somewhat different from what could be expected. This 
measure combines different charge levels with different types of revenue use. Alternative 
C and F have the highest charges, considerably higher than A and D. The estimated 
benefits of revenue use for alternatives A to C have been presented to the respondents, 
this has not been done for the alternatives where revenues are used to lower income taxes 
(D to F). Since higher charges tend to have more effect, alternative C and F may be 
expected to have more effect than the other alternatives, and B and E again more than A 
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and D. This is not entirely true. Measure 3B, for instance, is considerably less effective 
than measure 3A for all purposes. The amount of compensation is larger for measure 3B 
(not only MRB, but also BPM is abolished), but we explained that for both measures the 
government does not obtain extra revenues (revenue neutrality). A similar pattern is 
found for measure 3E (compared with 3D), but in this case allocation of revenues was 
unchanged. Most remarkable is that alternatives with the lowest charge levels (A and D) 
are even more effective than alternative C and F for certain purposes. The findings for the 
impact of revenue use (abolition of car taxation vs. income tax reductions) are for most 
trip purposes equal to the results for measure 1: variabilisation is said to be less effective. 
Only the outcomes found for measure 3C (visits) and 3A (other purposes) are different in 
this context, revenues hypothecated to reduce car taxation dominates income tax 
compensation in terms of effectiveness.  
 
Table 7: Aggregated outcomes of behavioural responses to measure 3: peak and off peak kilometre charge. 
 Commuting Visits Other 
Total number of trips (driven in 4 weeks) 6800 3620 7780 
Number of trips adjusted 
Of which: 
Public transport 
Slow traffic 
Motorised 
Carpool 
Travel at other times 
Working at home 
Not making trip 
930 (15%) 
 
17.6% 
12.7% 
8.8% 
4.5% 
47.7% 
7.9% 
0.6% 
529 (14.6%) 
 
13.6% 
28% 
1.7% 
not relevant 
47.8% 
not relevant 
8.9% 
1028 (13.2%) 
 
14.1% 
28.9% 
1.5% 
not relevant 
47.3% 
not relevant 
8.3% 
Number of kilometers adjusted 14.6% 13.2% 11.2% 
 
When we look at the effects of the measure for trip purposes, it seems that measure 3C 
has more effect on social visiting trips than for the other purposes. The reverse holds for 
the same purpose for measure 3F. Measure 3D tends to be less effective for other trips, 
while on the other hand measure 3A seems most effective for this type of trips. There 
seems not much of a difference over trip purposes for the other measures. 
 
Table 8: Effectiveness related to the alternatives of measure 3. 
% of total trips adjusted Measure 
Number of 
respondents Commuting Visits Other 
3A: 2/6 €cent (off-peak/peak), MRB 
3B: 4/12 €cent, MRB+BPM  
3C: 8/24 €cent, car taxation and new roads 
3D: 2/6 €cent, income taxes 
3E: 4/12 €cent, income taxes 
3F: 8/24 €cent, income taxes 
96 
91 
97 
96 
94 
88 
16.0 
13.8 
15.8 
19.0 
13.9 
21.3 
14.2 
10.0 
25.9 
18.9 
14.4 
16.6 
21.6 
12.1 
13.1 
14.4 
15.7 
23.2 
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5. Concluding remarks 
The results indicate that road pricing may have considerable effects, much depends on 
the design of the measure. In terms of trips adjusted, the effectiveness of the measures is 
in the range of 6% to 15% for all purposes. The effect in terms of kilometres is somewhat 
smaller. It is often difficult to compare these results with previous literature because of 
differences in the measures analysed and the research methods applied (modelling vs. 
stated preference). The work discussed here probably comes closest to the research by 
MuConsult (2002), although that study included also respondents not owning a car. The 
outcomes in terms of kilometres for measure 1A and 1B may be comparable to the results 
of the MuConsult study. Our results then show stronger effects, which cannot entirely be 
explained by the fact that we have not included non-car owners.  
There are considerable differences between trip purposes, with commuting generally 
being least sensitive when the charge is time independent. Measures 1 and 2 seem to have 
less effect on commuting trips, which is a rather usual result (e.g. see previous literature 
results on elasticities and modelling outcomes). In contrast, measures 3 and 2A have a 
stronger effect on commuting trips. A common characteristic of both measures is the 
differentiation according to time. Measure 3 seems to be most effective overall, 
especially for commuting trips.  
Slow transport is a popular alternative for trips to visit people or shopping trips, 
especially when it concerns a flat kilometre charge. This suggests that people often take 
the car for short trips that can be easily replaced by walking or cycling. Driving at other 
times is also a popular alternative, especially for the (car dependent) commuting trips. 
Commuting trips are hard to suppress (working at home or not making the trip are no 
serious options for most of the respondents), but there seems to be some flexibility 
allowing the rescheduling of trips. This is confirmed by the empirical results from 
Singapore (see Olszewski and Xie, 2005).  
The impact of the type of measure is not straightforward. Previous research and 
common sense suggest that higher kilometre charges have more impact. Our results are 
somewhat mixed on this issue and are difficult to explain. The effect of revenue use is 
obvious in most cases, the measures with revenues allocated to lower income taxes have 
generally more effect. Although not very satisfactory, this may be explained by the 
perceived financial disincentive. Income reduction may be effective, it may not be very 
acceptable. Ubbels and Verhoef (2005), for instance, show that income reductions might 
not be very acceptable, whereas abolition of car taxation is. This suggests a possible 
trade-off between acceptance and effectiveness, which is relevant to keep in mind. 
The decision whether or not to implement a price measure remains a political decision, 
but one should be aware that the effects depend very much on the type of measure. This 
work shows that when policy makers want to affect peak time (commuting) traffic a time-
differentiated measure seems most appropriate. The kilometre charge with additional 
peak charge is most effective overall, especially for commuting trips. Governments 
should be aware that implementation of these (time-dependent) charges most probably 
lead to driving at other times, especially for commuting trips.  
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Appendix 1: Description of measures 
 
Measure Alternatives 
1: Flat kilometre charge with 
different revenue allocations 
A: 3 €cent, revenues used to abolish car ownership taxes (MRB) 
B: 6 €cent, revenues used to abolish existing car taxation (purchase  
    (BPM) and ownership (MRB)) 
C: 12 €cent, revenues used to abolish existing car taxation and construct  
    new roads 
D: 3 €cent, revenues used to lower income taxes 
E: 6 €cent, revenues used to lower income taxes 
F: 12 €cent, revenues used to lower income taxes 
2: Flat kilometre charge with 
additional bottleneck charge 
(2A) or differentiated 
according to weight of the 
car (2B)  
A: 2 €cent, additional multistep toll during peak times (morning and  
    evening) on working days at daily bottlenecks: 6:00-7:00 € 0,50, 7:00- 
    7:30 € 1,00, 7:30-8:00 € 1,75, 8:00-8:30 € 2,50, 8:30-9:00 € 1,75,  
    9:00-9:30 € 1,00, 9:30-10:00 € 0,50. The same structure for the  
    evening peak (16.00-20.00). Revenues used to abolish car ownership  
    taxes (MRB) 
B: Light cars pay 4 €cent per kilometre; middle weight cars pay 6 €cent  
    per kilometre; heavy cars pay 8 €cent per kilometre, revenues used to  
    abolish existing car taxation (MRB and BPM) 
3: Peak and off peak 
kilometre charge and 
different revenue allocations 
A: 2 €cent outside peak times and 6 €cent in peak on working days  
    (7.00-9.00 and 17.00-19.00), abolition of car ownership taxes 
B: 4 €cent outside peak times and 12 €cent in peak on working days  
    (7.00-9.00 and 17.00-19.00), abolition of existing car taxation 
C: 8 €cent outside peak times and 24 €cent in peak on working days  
    (7.00-9.00 and 17.00-19.00), abolition of existing car taxation and  
    new roads 
D: 2 €cent outside peak times and 6 €cent in peak on working days  
    (7.00-9.00 and 17.00-19.00), revenues used to lower income taxes 
E: 4 €cent outside peak times and 12 €cent in peak on working days  
    (7.00-9.00 and 17.00-19.00), revenues to lower income taxes 
F: 8 €cent outside peak times and 24 €cent in peak on working days  
    (7.00-9.00 and 17.00-19.00), revenues used to lower income taxes 
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Appendix 2: Behavioural responses to each alternative of measure 1 and 3 
 
 
Measure Measure 1A Measure 1B Measure 1C 
Trip purpose Commuting Visits Other Commuting Visits Other Commuting Visits Other 
Total number of trips 
(driven in 4 weeks) 
1104 556 1468 1176 652 1176 1084 628 1160 
Trips adjusted (% total) 
Of which (%): 
Public transport 
Non-motorised  
Motorised 
Car pooling 
Working at home 
Not making the trip 
0 (0%) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
49 (8.8%) 
 
30.6% 
38.8% 
0% 
NR 
NR 
30.6% 
115 (7.8%) 
 
15.6% 
64.3% 
0% 
NR 
NR 
20% 
20 (1.7%) 
 
20% 
10% 
0% 
60% 
10% 
0% 
48 (7.4%) 
 
10.4% 
56.3% 
8.3% 
NR 
NR 
25.0% 
80 (6.8%) 
 
6.3% 
77.5% 
2.5% 
NR 
NR 
17.8% 
45 (4.1%) 
 
51.1% 
22.2% 
6.7% 
0% 
20% 
0% 
104 (16.6%) 
 
10.6% 
44.2% 
18.3% 
NR 
NR 
26.9% 
149 (12.8%) 
 
14.1% 
60.4% 
6.0% 
NR 
NR 
19.5% 
 
Measure Measure 1D Measure 1E Measure 1F 
Trip purpose Commuting Visits Other Commuting Visits Other Commuting Visits Other 
Total number of trips 
(driven in 4 weeks) 
1212 592 1408 1176 592 1332 1048 600 1236 
Trips adjusted (% total) 
Of which (%): 
Public transport 
Non-motorised 
Motorised 
Car pooling 
Working at home 
Not making the trip 
100 (8.3%) 
 
12.0% 
55.0% 
14.0% 
11.0% 
7.0% 
1.0% 
77 (13%) 
 
27.3% 
53.2% 
0% 
NR 
NR 
19.5% 
179 (12.7%) 
 
14.0% 
63.7% 
0% 
NR 
NR 
22.3% 
79 (6.7%) 
 
39.2% 
30.4% 
1.3% 
24% 
5.1% 
0% 
105 (17.7%) 
 
12.4% 
39.0% 
11.4% 
NR 
NR 
37.1% 
141 (10.6%) 
 
9.2% 
68.8% 
0.7% 
NR 
NR 
21.3% 
156 (14.9%) 
 
36.5% 
24.4% 
12.8% 
23.1% 
2.6% 
0.6% 
130 (21.7%) 
 
20.9% 
41.1% 
8.8% 
NR 
NR 
29.0% 
182 (14.7%) 
 
17.0% 
61.5% 
1.6% 
NR 
NR 
19.8% 
NR = not relevant, alternative is not related to trip purpose. 
 
Measure Measure 3A Measure 3B Measure 3C 
Trip purpose Commuting Visits Other Commuting Visits Other Commuting Visits Other 
Total number of trips 
(driven in 4 weeks) 
1256 636 1572 1096 500 1160 1168 708 1200 
Trips adjusted (% total) 
Of which: 
Public transport 
Non-motorised 
Motorised 
Car pooling 
Travel at other times 
Working at home 
Not making the trip 
161 (12.8%) 
 
2.5% 
0% 
13% 
0% 
71.4% 
13.0% 
0% 
75 (11.8%) 
 
34.7% 
10.7% 
0% 
NR 
45.3% 
NR 
9.3% 
222 (14.1%) 
 
16.2% 
23.4% 
0% 
NR 
56.3% 
NR 
4.0% 
139 (12.7%) 
 
21.6% 
20.1% 
6.5% 
0% 
43.9% 
7.9% 
0% 
53 (10.6%) 
 
13.2% 
20.8% 
0% 
NR 
60.4% 
NR 
5.7% 
124 (10.7%) 
 
25.8% 
23.4% 
0.8% 
NR 
46% 
NR 
4.0% 
159 (13.6%) 
 
28.9% 
30.2% 
8.8% 
3.8% 
20.1% 
8.2% 
0% 
137 (19.3%) 
 
8.7% 
30.6% 
2.9% 
NR 
43.8% 
NR 
13.9% 
135 (11.3%) 
 
3.7% 
29.6% 
1.5% 
NR 
46.7% 
NR 
18.5% 
NR = not relevant, measure may not be differentiated according to time or variant is not related to trip purpose.  
 
Measure Measure 3D Measure 3E Measure 3F 
Trip purpose Commuting Visits Other Commuting Visits Other Commuting Visits Other 
Total number of trips 
(driven in 4 weeks) 
1136 640 1256 1112 524 1224 1032 612 1388 
Trips adjusted (% total) 
Of which: 
Public transport 
Non-motorised 
Motorised 
Car pooling 
Travel at other times 
Working at home 
Not making the trip 
191 (16.8%) 
 
23.0% 
7.8% 
0% 
8.4% 
57.1% 
3.1% 
0.5% 
100 (15.6%) 
 
4% 
38% 
2% 
NR 
52% 
NR 
4% 
148 (11.9%) 
 
3.4% 
43.9% 
2.6% 
NR 
46.6% 
NR 
4% 
140 (12.6%) 
 
10% 
15.7% 
0% 
12.8% 
55% 
5.7% 
0.7% 
76 (13.9%) 
 
3.9% 
25% 
3.9% 
NR 
53.9% 
NR 
13.1% 
161 (13.2%) 
 
8.7% 
32.9% 
0% 
NR 
50.3% 
NR 
8% 
214 (20.7%) 
 
18.2% 
7.% 
21% 
2.3% 
39.7% 
9.8% 
1.9% 
88 (14.4%) 
 
22.7% 
34.1% 
0% 
NR 
38.6% 
NR 
4.5% 
238 (17.2%) 
 
22.2% 
24.4% 
3.8% 
NR 
38.2% 
NR 
11.3% 
NR = not relevant, measure may not be differentiated according to time or alternative is not related to trip purpose. 
 
